| Title | Authors | Bibtex |
|---|---|---|
| Local-Effect Games | Leyton-Brown, Tennenholtz | @inproceedings{LEG, title = "Local-Effect Games", author = "K. Leyton-Brown and M. Tennenholtz", booktitle = "IJCAI-03", year = "2003" } |
| A course in game theory | Osborne, Rubinstein | @book{OsbRub, AUTHOR = "M.J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein", TITLE = "A Course in Game Theory", PUBLISHER = "MIT Press", YEAR = 1994 } |
| Equilibrium points in N-person games | Nash | @article{Nash50, AUTHOR= "J.F. Nash", TITLE = "Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games", JOURNAL = "Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America", YEAR = 1950, VOLUME = 36, PAGES = "48--49" } |
| Pure Nash Equilibria: Hard and Easy Games | George Gottlob,Gianluigi Greco,Francesco Scarcello | To appear in TARK IX |
| Game Theory (II) | Fudenburg, Tirole | @book{FudTir, AUTHOR = "D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole", TITLE = "Game Theory", PUBLISHER = "MIT Press", YEAR = 1991 } |
| Game Theory (I) | Guillermo Owen | |
| Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results | Cooper, DeJong, Forsynthe, Ross | |
| Game Theory and Agents | Stefan J. Johansson | @misc{ johansson-game, author = "Stefan J. Johansson", title = "Game Theory and Agents", url = "citeseer.nj.nec.com/johansson99game.html" } |
| Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice | Topkis | |
| An Experimental Study of N-Person Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games | X. Yao, P. Darwen | @inproceedings{ yao94experimental, author = "Xin Yao and Paul J. Darwen", title = "An Experimental Study of N-Person Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games", booktitle = "Evo Workshops", pages = "90-108", year = "1994", url = "citeseer.nj.nec.com/yao94experimental.html" } |
| A Course in Microeconomic Theory | David M. Kreps | |
| Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities | Milgrom, Roberts | |
| The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game Is a Complete Lattice | Lin Zhou | |
| Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements are Unstable | Echenique, Edlin | |
| Monotone Comparative Statics | Milgrom, Shannon | |
| Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum N-Person Supermodular Games | Topkis | |
| Computing Supergame Equilibria | Judd, Yeltekin, Conklin | |
| Dynamic Games of Innovation | Jennifer Reinganum | |
| The Strategy of Conflict | Thomas Schelling | |
| Games and Decisions | Luce, Raiffa | |
| A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games | Harsanyi, Selton | |
| Exotic Phenomena in Games and Duopoly Models | David Rand | |
| Existence of Nash Equilibrium in N-Person Games without Quasiconcavity | Nishimura, Friedman | |
| Iterative Solution of Games by Ficticious Play | G. W. Brown | |
| An Iterative Method of Solving a Game | Julia Robinson | |
| Some Topics in Two-Person Games | Lloyd Shapley | |
| Differential Games | Avner Friedman | |
| Sufficiency Conditions for Nash Equilibrium in N-Person Differential Games | Stalford, Leitmann | |
| Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory | Basar, Tamer, Olsder | |
| Theory of Games and Economic Behavior | Von Neumann, Morgenstern | |
| Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning: Theoretical Framework and an Algorithm | Hu, Wellman | @inproceedings{HuWellman, author={J. Hu and M.P. Wellman}, title={Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning: Theoretical Framework and an Algorithm}, booktitle={ICML}, year=1998 } |
| Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria | Conitzer, Sandholm | @techreport{ConitzerSandholm, AUTHOR = "V. Conitzer and T. Sandholm", TITLE = "{Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria}", INSTITUTION = "{CMU}", YEAR = 2002, NUMBER = "CM-CS-02-135" } |
| Potential Games | D. Monderer and L.S. Shapley | @article{MondererShapley96, author={D. Monderer and L.S. Shapley}, title={Potential Games}, journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, volume={14}, pages={124--143}, year={1996}} |
| A Class of Games Possessing Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria | R.W. Rosenthal | @article{Rosenthal73, author={R.W. Rosenthal}, title={A Class of Games Possessing Pure-Strategy {Nash} Equilibria}, journal={International Journal of Game Theory}, volume={2}, pages={65--67}, year={1973}} |
| Stability in Competition | H. Hotelling | @article{Hotelling29, author={H. Hotelling}, title={Stability in Competition}, journal={Economic Journal}, volume={39}, pages={41--57}, year={1929}} |
| Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition | M.J. Osborne and C. Pitchik | @article{OsbornePitchik87, author={M.J. Osborne and C. Pitchik}, title={Equilibrium in {Hotelling's} model of competition}, journal={Econometrica}, volume={55}, pages={911-922}, year={1987}} |
| Multi-Agent Algorithms for solving graphical games | D. Vickrey and D. Koller | @inproceedings{graphicalgames, author = "D. Vickrey and D. Koller", title = "Multi-Agent Algorithms for solving graphical games", booktitle = "AAAI", year = "2002" } |
| Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams for Representing and Solving Games | D. Koller and B. Milch | @inproceedings{maids, author = "D. Koller and B. Milch", title = "Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams for Representing and Solving Games", booktitle = "IJCAI", year = "2001" } |
| Graphical Models for Game Theory | M. Kearns and M. Littman and S. Singh | @inproceedings{kearns1, author = "M. Kearns and M. Littman and S. Singh", title = "Graphical Models for Game Theory", booktitle = "UAI", year = "2001"} |
| Efficient Nash Computation in Large Population Games with Bounded Influence | M. Kearns and Y. Mansour | @inproceedings{kearns2, title="Efficient {Nash} Computation in Large Population Games with Bounded Influence", author="M. Kearns and Y. Mansour", booktitle = "UAI", year = "2002" } |
| Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games | T. Roughgarden and E. Tardos | @techreport{roughgarden, author = {T. Roughgarden and E. Tardos}, month = {June}, year = 2001, title = {Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games}, number = {TR2002-1866}, wasaddress = {Ithaca}, institution = {Cornell} } |
| A Continuation Method for Nash Equilibria In Structured games | Ben Blum, Chris Shelton, Daphne Koller | |
| Computation of Equilibria in Finite Games | R. McKelvey and A. McLennan | http://robotics.stanford.edu/~rwporter/ |
| Computing Equlibria for Two-Person Games. | B. von Stengel | Ryan's webpage |
| Nash propagation for Loopy Graphical Games | Ortiz and Kearns | |
| The Complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form. | D. Koller, N. Meggido | |
| On the np-completeness of finding an optimal strategy in games with common payoffs | Chu and J. Halpern | internat. Journal of game theory, 2001 |
| A polynomial time nash equilibrium algorithm for repeated games. | M. Littman, P. Stone | EC 2003 |
| Efficient Computation of Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games | Daphne Koller, Nimrod Megiddo, Bernhard von Stengel | @misc{ koller96efficient, author = "D. Koller and N. Meggido and B. von Stengel", title = "Efficient computation of equilibria for extensive two-person games", text = "D. Koller, N. Meggido, and B. von Stengel. Efficient computation of equilibria for extensive two-person games. Games and Economic Behaviour, 14(2):247--259, June 1996.", year = "1996", url = "citeseer.nj.nec.com/koller96efficient.html" } |
| Simulated annealing of games equilibria. | M. Pearson, P. La-Mura | Unpublished |
| Web Page for course "Rationality, Democracy and Public Policy" at colorado.edu | ||
| Team Games As Models of Intergroup Conflicts | Gary Bornstein & Roger Hurwits | (June 1993). The internal problem of collective action that arises when groups, as opposed to individuals, are in conflict cannot be studied in the context of two-person games that treat the competing groups as unitary players. Traditional N-person games are also too restrictive for this purpose, since they ignore the conflict of interests between the groups. Because the intergroup conflict motivates the need for intragroup collective action, and the groups' respective success in mobilizing collective action determines the outcome of the intergroup competition, the intergroup and intragroup levels should be considered simultaneously. This paper: (a) proposes to model intergroup conflicts as team games (Palfrey & Rosenthal, 1983; (b) offers an initial taxonomy for this class of games; and (c) illustrates some applications for strategic analyses of intergroup conflict and political interactions. |
| Values of Smooth Non-Atomic Games: The Method of Multilinear Approximation in The Shapley Value | Monderer, Neyman | |
| Weighted Majority Games Have Many mu-Values | Monderer | International Journal of Game Theory 18, 321--326. |
| Subjective Reasoning in Dynamic Games | Yossi Feinberg | |
| An Incomplete Cooperation Structure for a Voting Game Can Be Strategically Stable | Yossi Feinberg | |
| Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study | Miguel Costa-Gomes, Vincent Crawford, and Bruno Broseta | |
| A Game of Fair Division | Vincent Crawford | |
| Game Theory As a Theory of Conflict Resolution | A. Rapaport (Ed.) | |
| Models of Strategic Rationality | Reinhard Selten | |
| Game Theory Topics: Incomplete Information, Repeated Games, and N-Player Games | Evelyn C. Fink, Scott Gates, Brian D. Humes | |
| Equilibrium III: Some Recent Types of Equilibrium Models | Donald A. Walker (Ed.) | |
| Games and Information | Eric Rasmusen | |
| The 2X2 Game | Rapoport, Guyer, Gordon | |
| A Taxonomy of 2X2 Games | Rapoport and Guyer | |
| The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technoly, Strategy, and Organization | Milgrom and Roberts | |
| Prisoner's Dilemma - Recollections and Observations | Anatol Rapoport | |
| Braithwaite's Arbitration Scheme | D. Marc Kilgour | |
| A Note on Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Asymmetric Animal Conflict | Reinhard Selten | |
| Deception in 2 X 2 Games | Steven J. Brahms | |
| Omniscience and Omnipotence: How they may Help - of Hurt - in a Game | Steven J. Brahms | |
| Computational Models of Games | Anne Condon | |
| Algorithms for Games | Adelson-Velsky, Arlazarov, Donskoy | |
| An Introduction to Linear Programming and Matrix Game Theory | M. J. Fryer | |
| Geometric Games and Their Applications | W. H. Ruckle | |
| A Gentle Introduction to Game Theory | Saul Stahl | |
| Games of Strategy | Melvin Dresher | |
| Game Theory and Experimental Games | Andrew Coleman | |
| Dispersion Games | T. Grenager, R. Powers, Y. Shoham | |
| Friend-or-Foe Q-learning in general-sum games. | Michael Littman | In proc 18-th ICML, 2001 |
| A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium | S. Hart, A. Mas-Colell | Econometrica, 68, 2000, 1127-1150 |
| Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games | R.D. McKelvey, T.R. Palfrey | Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 1995, 6-38 |
| Worst - Case Equilibria | Elias Koutsoupias and Christos Papadimitriou | |
| The Price of Anarchy is Independent of the Network Topology | Tim RoughGarden | Journal of Computer and System Sciences and STOC 2002 |
| Rational and convergent Learning in Stochastic Games | Michael Bowling and Manuela Veloso | Introduces Wolf Learning Algorithm Tested on repeated versions of matching pennies, rock-paper-scissors, grid world and soccer |
| Markov Games as a Framework for Multi-Agent Reinforcment Learning | Michael Littman | |
| Multiagent Q-Learning | Junling Hu and Michael Wellman | |
| Evolutionary Game Theory | Jorgen W. Weibull | |
| Web Games and Strategic Behavior: Recipes for Interactive Learning | Charkes A. Holt | |
| Lecture Notes from Columbia University Economics W4415: Game Theory | Levent Koçkesen | http://www.columbia.edu/~lk290/gameug.htm |
| An Introduction to Game Theory (draft of Chapter 3) | Martin Osborne | |
| Backwards induction in the centipede game | John Broome and Wlodek Rabinowicz | http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0060/pdf/backwards%20induction.pdf |
| Efficient Computation of Behavior Strategies | Bernhard von Stengel | @misc{ stengel-efficient, author = "B. von Stengel", title = "Efficient computation of behavior strategies", text = "B. von Stengel (1996a), Efficient computation of behavior strategies. Games and Economic Behavior 14, 220--246.", url = "citeseer.nj.nec.com/vonstengel96efficient.html" } |
| Dominance Solvable English Multi-item Auctions | Kamecke, Ulrich | abstract is at http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/sfb/papers/abstracts/bonnsfa447.html Kamecke, Ulrich (1994): Dominance Solvable English Multi-item Auctions, SFB 303, Universität Bonn, Discussion Paper No. A-447 |
| An Efficient, Exact Algorithm for Solving Tree-Structured Graphical Games | Littman, Kearns, (Singh?) | @misc{ littman-efficient, author = "Michael L. Littman and Michael Kearns", title = "An Efficient, Exact Algorithm for Solving Tree-Structured Graphical Games", url = "citeseer.nj.nec.com/543070.html" } |
| Global Games: Theory and Application | Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin | http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d12b/d1275-r.pdf |
| Congestion games and potentials reconsidered | Voorneveld, Borm, and van Megen | |
| Introduction to tutorial on the theory of the firm and industry equilibrium | Martin J. Osborne | http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~osborne/2x3/tutorial/index.html |