GAMUT References
Title Authors Bibtex
Local-Effect Games Leyton-Brown, Tennenholtz @inproceedings{LEG,
title = "Local-Effect Games",
author = "K. Leyton-Brown and M. Tennenholtz",
booktitle = "IJCAI-03",
year = "2003"
A course in game theory Osborne, Rubinstein @book{OsbRub,
AUTHOR = "M.J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein",
TITLE = "A Course in Game Theory",
YEAR = 1994
Equilibrium points in N-person games Nash @article{Nash50,
AUTHOR= "J.F. Nash",
TITLE = "Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games",
JOURNAL = "Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America",
YEAR = 1950,
VOLUME = 36,
PAGES = "48--49"
Pure Nash Equilibria: Hard and Easy Games George Gottlob,Gianluigi Greco,Francesco Scarcello To appear in TARK IX
Game Theory (II) Fudenburg, Tirole @book{FudTir,
AUTHOR = "D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole",
TITLE = "Game Theory",
YEAR = 1991
Game Theory (I) Guillermo Owen
Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results Cooper, DeJong, Forsynthe, Ross
Game Theory and Agents Stefan J. Johansson @misc{ johansson-game,
author = "Stefan J. Johansson",
title = "Game Theory and Agents",
url = "" }
Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice Topkis
An Experimental Study of N-Person Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games X. Yao, P. Darwen @inproceedings{ yao94experimental,
author = "Xin Yao and Paul J. Darwen",
title = "An Experimental Study of N-Person Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games",
booktitle = "Evo Workshops",
pages = "90-108",
year = "1994",
url = "" }
A Course in Microeconomic Theory David M. Kreps
Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities Milgrom, Roberts
The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game Is a Complete Lattice Lin Zhou
Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements are Unstable Echenique, Edlin
Monotone Comparative Statics Milgrom, Shannon
Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum N-Person Supermodular Games Topkis
Computing Supergame Equilibria Judd, Yeltekin, Conklin
Dynamic Games of Innovation Jennifer Reinganum
The Strategy of Conflict Thomas Schelling
Games and Decisions Luce, Raiffa
A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games Harsanyi, Selton
Exotic Phenomena in Games and Duopoly Models David Rand
Existence of Nash Equilibrium in N-Person Games without Quasiconcavity Nishimura, Friedman
Iterative Solution of Games by Ficticious Play G. W. Brown
An Iterative Method of Solving a Game Julia Robinson
Some Topics in Two-Person Games Lloyd Shapley
Differential Games Avner Friedman
Sufficiency Conditions for Nash Equilibrium in N-Person Differential Games Stalford, Leitmann
Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory Basar, Tamer, Olsder
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior Von Neumann, Morgenstern
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning: Theoretical Framework and an Algorithm Hu, Wellman @inproceedings{HuWellman,
author={J. Hu and M.P. Wellman},
title={Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning: Theoretical Framework and an Algorithm},
Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria Conitzer, Sandholm @techreport{ConitzerSandholm,
AUTHOR = "V. Conitzer and T. Sandholm",
TITLE = "{Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria}",
YEAR = 2002,
NUMBER = "CM-CS-02-135"
Potential Games D. Monderer and L.S. Shapley @article{MondererShapley96,
author={D. Monderer and L.S. Shapley},
title={Potential Games},
journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
A Class of Games Possessing Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria R.W. Rosenthal @article{Rosenthal73,
author={R.W. Rosenthal},
title={A Class of Games Possessing Pure-Strategy {Nash} Equilibria},
journal={International Journal of Game Theory},
Stability in Competition H. Hotelling @article{Hotelling29,
author={H. Hotelling},
title={Stability in Competition},
journal={Economic Journal},
Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition M.J. Osborne and C. Pitchik @article{OsbornePitchik87,
author={M.J. Osborne and C. Pitchik},
title={Equilibrium in {Hotelling's} model of competition},
Multi-Agent Algorithms for solving graphical games D. Vickrey and D. Koller @inproceedings{graphicalgames,
author = "D. Vickrey and D. Koller",
title = "Multi-Agent Algorithms for solving graphical games",
booktitle = "AAAI",
year = "2002"
Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams for Representing and Solving Games D. Koller and B. Milch @inproceedings{maids,
author = "D. Koller and B. Milch",
title = "Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams for Representing and Solving Games",
booktitle = "IJCAI",
year = "2001"
Graphical Models for Game Theory M. Kearns and M. Littman and S. Singh @inproceedings{kearns1,
author = "M. Kearns and M. Littman and S. Singh",
title = "Graphical Models for Game Theory",
booktitle = "UAI",
year = "2001"}
Efficient Nash Computation in Large Population Games with Bounded Influence M. Kearns and Y. Mansour @inproceedings{kearns2,
title="Efficient {Nash} Computation in Large Population Games with Bounded Influence",
author="M. Kearns and Y. Mansour",
booktitle = "UAI",
year = "2002" }
Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games T. Roughgarden and E. Tardos @techreport{roughgarden,
author = {T. Roughgarden and E. Tardos},
month = {June},
year = 2001,
title = {Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games},
number = {TR2002-1866},
wasaddress = {Ithaca},
institution = {Cornell}
A Continuation Method for Nash Equilibria In Structured games Ben Blum, Chris Shelton, Daphne Koller
Computation of Equilibria in Finite Games R. McKelvey and A. McLennan
Computing Equlibria for Two-Person Games. B. von Stengel Ryan's webpage
Nash propagation for Loopy Graphical Games Ortiz and Kearns
The Complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form. D. Koller, N. Meggido
On the np-completeness of finding an optimal strategy in games with common payoffs Chu and J. Halpern internat. Journal of game theory, 2001
A polynomial time nash equilibrium algorithm for repeated games. M. Littman, P. Stone EC 2003
Efficient Computation of Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games Daphne Koller, Nimrod Megiddo, Bernhard von Stengel @misc{ koller96efficient,
author = "D. Koller and N. Meggido and B. von Stengel",
title = "Efficient computation of equilibria for extensive two-person games",
text = "D. Koller, N. Meggido, and B. von Stengel. Efficient computation of equilibria
for extensive two-person games. Games and Economic Behaviour, 14(2):247--259,
June 1996.",
year = "1996",
url = "" }
Simulated annealing of games equilibria. M. Pearson, P. La-Mura Unpublished
Web Page for course "Rationality, Democracy and Public Policy" at

Team Games As Models of Intergroup Conflicts Gary Bornstein & Roger Hurwits (June 1993).

The internal problem of collective action that arises when groups, as opposed to individuals, are in conflict cannot be studied in the context of two-person games that treat the competing groups as unitary players. Traditional N-person games are also too restrictive for this purpose, since they ignore the conflict of interests between the groups. Because the intergroup conflict motivates the need for intragroup collective action, and the groups' respective success in mobilizing collective action determines the outcome of the intergroup competition, the intergroup and intragroup levels should be considered simultaneously. This paper: (a) proposes to model intergroup conflicts as team games (Palfrey & Rosenthal, 1983; (b) offers an initial taxonomy for this class of games; and (c) illustrates some applications for strategic analyses of intergroup conflict and political interactions.
Values of Smooth Non-Atomic Games: The Method of Multilinear Approximation in The Shapley Value Monderer, Neyman
Weighted Majority Games Have Many mu-Values Monderer International Journal of Game Theory 18, 321--326.
Subjective Reasoning in Dynamic Games Yossi Feinberg
An Incomplete Cooperation Structure for a Voting Game Can Be Strategically Stable Yossi Feinberg
Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study Miguel Costa-Gomes, Vincent Crawford, and Bruno Broseta
A Game of Fair Division Vincent Crawford
Game Theory As a Theory of Conflict Resolution A. Rapaport (Ed.)
Models of Strategic Rationality Reinhard Selten
Game Theory Topics: Incomplete Information, Repeated Games, and N-Player Games Evelyn C. Fink, Scott Gates, Brian D. Humes
Equilibrium III: Some Recent Types of Equilibrium Models Donald A. Walker (Ed.)
Games and Information Eric Rasmusen
The 2X2 Game Rapoport, Guyer, Gordon
A Taxonomy of 2X2 Games Rapoport and Guyer
The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technoly, Strategy, and Organization Milgrom and Roberts
Prisoner's Dilemma - Recollections and Observations Anatol Rapoport
Braithwaite's Arbitration Scheme D. Marc Kilgour
A Note on Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Asymmetric Animal Conflict Reinhard Selten
Deception in 2 X 2 Games Steven J. Brahms
Omniscience and Omnipotence: How they may Help - of Hurt - in a Game Steven J. Brahms
Computational Models of Games Anne Condon
Algorithms for Games Adelson-Velsky, Arlazarov, Donskoy
An Introduction to Linear Programming and Matrix Game Theory M. J. Fryer
Geometric Games and Their Applications W. H. Ruckle
A Gentle Introduction to Game Theory Saul Stahl
Games of Strategy Melvin Dresher
Game Theory and Experimental Games Andrew Coleman
Dispersion Games T. Grenager, R. Powers, Y. Shoham
Friend-or-Foe Q-learning in general-sum games. Michael Littman In proc 18-th ICML, 2001
A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium S. Hart, A. Mas-Colell Econometrica, 68, 2000, 1127-1150
Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games R.D. McKelvey, T.R. Palfrey Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 1995, 6-38
Worst - Case Equilibria Elias Koutsoupias and Christos Papadimitriou
The Price of Anarchy is Independent of the Network Topology Tim RoughGarden Journal of Computer and System Sciences
and STOC 2002
Rational and convergent Learning in Stochastic Games Michael Bowling and Manuela Veloso Introduces Wolf Learning Algorithm
Tested on repeated versions of matching pennies, rock-paper-scissors,
grid world and soccer
Markov Games as a Framework for Multi-Agent Reinforcment Learning Michael Littman
Multiagent Q-Learning Junling Hu and Michael Wellman
Evolutionary Game Theory Jorgen W. Weibull
Web Games and Strategic Behavior: Recipes for Interactive Learning Charkes A. Holt
Lecture Notes from Columbia University Economics W4415: Game Theory Levent Koçkesen
An Introduction to Game Theory (draft of Chapter 3) Martin Osborne
Backwards induction in the centipede game John Broome and Wlodek Rabinowicz
Efficient Computation of Behavior Strategies Bernhard von Stengel @misc{ stengel-efficient,
author = "B. von Stengel",
title = "Efficient computation of behavior strategies",
text = "B. von Stengel (1996a), Efficient computation of behavior strategies. Games
and Economic Behavior 14, 220--246.",
url = "" }
Dominance Solvable English Multi-item Auctions Kamecke, Ulrich abstract is at

Kamecke, Ulrich (1994): Dominance Solvable English Multi-item Auctions, SFB 303, Universität Bonn, Discussion Paper No. A-447
An Efficient, Exact Algorithm for Solving Tree-Structured Graphical Games Littman, Kearns, (Singh?) @misc{ littman-efficient,
author = "Michael L. Littman and Michael Kearns",
title = "An Efficient, Exact Algorithm for Solving Tree-Structured Graphical Games",
url = "" }
Global Games: Theory and Application Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Congestion games and potentials reconsidered Voorneveld, Borm, and van Megen
Introduction to tutorial on the theory of the firm and industry equilibrium Martin J. Osborne